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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ELIZA RUE WOOD, 
vs. 
THEO N. WOOD and 
RUTH L. WOOD, 
Appellant, 
Case No. 8886 
Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At the close of the evidence in the Lower Court, the 
respondents moved the Court, pursuant to Rule 50, 
U.R.C.P., to direct a verdict in their favor for no cause 
of action. Among the various grounds urged in support 
of this motion, was the ground that on the uncontroverted 
facts, the appellant, admittedly occupying the status of 
licensee, had assumed the risk of, or was contributorily 
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negligent in, proceeding along a known dangerous route 
to obtain entrance to the respondents' home and, in addi-
tion, that the respondents had not breached a duty to the 
appellant. The Court granted respondents' motion from 
which an appeal has been taken. 
The appellant has attempted to confine the issue on 
appeal to that of contributory negligence, but the ruling 
of the trial court was based upon all of the doctrines per-
taining to the relationship of a host-licensor to a guest-
licensee announced by this Court in the Tempest case, 
ultra. 
The ruling granting the directed verdict is clearly 
supported by the uncontradicted evidence in the record 
considered in the light of the law announced by the Su-
preme Court of Utah and generally adopted throughout 
the United States. 
FACTS 
The facts in this case are generally not disputed nor 
significantly controverted by any of the parties. The 
statement made by the appellant is generally accurate, but 
is significantly silent on the testimony of the appellant and 
the facts adduced which support the ruling of the trial 
court. We therefore believe a recital of all of the facts 
would prove most helpful. 
Prior to October 15, 1956, the date of the incident 
complained of, the appellant had made two previous visits 
to the home of the respondents. The second occasion, she 
testified, took place sometime in December of 19 55. On 
both of the visits, the appellant entered the home of the 
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respondents by using the front walkway and entrance. 
(T. 3 8) On the visit in December, the appellant was 
shown the entire premises owned by the respondents, in-
cluding a walkway originating by the garage leading 
around to the den in the rear of the house. (T. 51, 53) 
She was shown throughout the main floor of the house, 
including all of the rooms, and she was shown into the 
interior garage area and walked down to the basement 
using the very stairway into which she fell on the night 
of October 15, 1956, which fall precipitated this litiga-
tion. (T. 35, 37, 51, 53) 
On the evening of the accident, the appellant trav-
elled to the home of the respondents, arriving there some-
time around seven o'clock. It was dark by this time. She 
stated that the lights on her husband's car were on when 
they drove into the driveway and that her husband stopped 
his car opposite the walkway which leads to the front door 
of the home of the respondents. (T. 40) In such position, 
the headlights of the automobile would shine into and 
would illuminate the garage through which appellant 
thereafter proceeded. (Ex. 1-P) She stated that there 
were no lights on in the front part of the house but that 
she could see a light shining through the doorway which 
leads from the house to the stairway in the garage area. 
Appellant testified that her husband then turned off the 
lights of the car and she proceeded from the car into the 
then darkened garage area, a route she had not traversed 
before. (T. 40) In this regard, her testimony from the 
record is as follows (T. 40, Line 2) : 
Q: Now, you stated that it was dark, I believe? 
Could you tell me, was it dark enough to see 
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where you were going on the evening of Octo-
ber 15th when you proceeded into the garage? 
A: Well, I wouldn't have known too well where 
I was going if I hadn't seen this light there. 
Q: ... could you see where you ·were stepping? 
A: Well, no. 
Q: It was so dark that you couldn't see where 
you were stepping then? 
A: Yes. 
In spite of not being able to see where she was step-
ping, the appellant proceeded into the respondents' garage 
toward the stairway into which she fell. In this regard 
the respondent testified (T. 40, Line 23): 
Q: ... and you knew that the stairway was in the 
garage? 
A: I knew the stairway was. 
And again (T. 37, Line 1): 
Q: ... Now then, when you and your husband 
pulled into the driveway on the evening of 
October 15, 1956, you knew that the stairway 
was in the garage because on your previous 
visit you did go down this stairway? 
A: Yes. 
And again the appellant testified (T. 35, Line 27): 
Q: And you knew you were in the garage when 
you made the previous visit (the visit in 
December)? 
A: Yes. 
Q: So you knew the stairway was there and knew 
that it was in the garage? 
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A: Yes. 
Q: And you knew it on the evening of October 
15, 1956, did you not? 
A: Yes. 
It is not rebutted in this record that neither of the 
respondents expected the appellant to use the garage to 
enter the home. (T. 66, 78) It was expected, on the other 
hand, that all visitors would use the front door and on all 
previous visits to the home of the respondents, the appellant 
had used the front door. (T. 77) It is further significant 
to note that the appellant did not even attempt to contra-
dict the testimony of Ruth Wood to the effect that 
immediately after the accident, when Theo Wood asked 
if she didn't remember that the stairway was there, the 
appellant replied tty es," but because she had been so upset 
over the wedding she had temporarily forgotten. (T. 78) 
In summary then this record shows from the testi-
mony of the appellant and without dispute or contradic-
tion that she was familiar with the premises she was 
entering and she was particularly familiar with the stair-
way into which she fell and its location in the garage. She 
had two known alternate safe routes to travel into the 
home of the respondents and the respondents expected 
her to use the front entrance only. In spite of this knowl-
edge possessed by the appellant, she proceeded into the 
darkened area, to which no license had been extended, 
after her husband had turned off the lights on the vehicle 
which would illuminate her course of travel and she fell 
into a known stairwell even though she was proceeding 
without being able to see where she stepped. May we fur-
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ther make the observation that the light coming from the 
door of the den, to be seen by the appellant, would have 
to shine directly over the stairway into which she fell and 
such light would certainly reveal to a reasonably alert person 
that no barrier existed between the door and the observer 
and around the stairwell. 
Moreover, there is no showing nor even an allegation 
of an affirmative act on the part of these respondents 
which contributed in any way to appellant's fall. 
These uncontroverted facts when considered with 
the law announced by this Court and unanimous author-
ity in the United States, substantiates the Lower Court's 
order. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE DIRECTED VERDICT GRANTED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT IS SUPPORTED BY THE ADMITTED 
FACTS AND THE LAW ESTABLISHED BY THIS 
COURT. 
A. The Appellant Was A Licensee On The Respond-
dents' Premises And The Respondents Did Not Breach 
A Duty Owing The Appellant. 
B. Appellant Knew Of The E:xiste-~tce Of The Stair-
way In The Garage And Must Therefore Be Charged With 
Assu11tPtion Of Risk Or Contributory Negligence As A 
Matter Of Law. 
C. Appellant Proceeded Into A1z Area Without Being 
Able To See Where She Was Going And When Alternate 
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Safe Routes Were Available~ She Must, Therefore, Be 
Charged With Contributory Negligence Or Assumption 
Of Risk As A Matter Of Law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DIRECTED VERDICT GRANTED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT IS SUPPORTED BY THE ADMITTED 
FACTS AND THE LAW ESTABLISHED BY THIS 
COURT. 
A. The Appellant Was A Licensee On The Respond-
ents' Premises And The Respondents Did Not Breach A 
Duty Owing The Appellant. 
The Appellant conceded at the time of the trial that 
she was only a guest-licensee on the premises of the Re-
spondents. It is most important to bear this status of the 
Appellant constantly in mind, because the authorities, so 
far as we have been able to determine, are unanimous in 
holding that the only duty which a host owes to a social 
guest is to refrain from affirmative acts likely to cause 
injury and to warn the guest-licensee of hidden or con-
cealed dangers which the guest-licensee can be expected 
to encounter and of which the guest does not know or by 
the exercise of reasonable care cannot see and avoid. 
Tempest vs. Richardson, 5 Utah 2d 174 
Tarreiau vs. Meghrigia.n, 99 A. 2d 207 
Niebes vs. Order of Eagles, 114 N.E. 2d 260 
Keretian vs. Asadourian, 110 N.E. 2d 679 
Schiebel vs. Lipton, 102 N.E. 2d 453 
Bogateroff vs. Coplan, 108 N.Y.S. 2d 205 
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Lubenow vs. Cock, 79 A 2d 826 
O'Brien vs. Shea, 96 N.E. 2d 163 
McHenry vs. Howells, 272 P. 2d 210 
Furthermore a host is not liable to a guest for ordi-
nary acts of negligence. 
Niebes vs. Order of Eagles, Supra. 
Biggs vs. Bea.r, 51 N.E. 2d 79 
The rule is likewise well established that a guest-
licensee takes the premises of his host-licensor as he finds 
them and the host-licensor is only obligated to provide the 
guest-licensee with the same protection which he takes for 
himself and members of his own family, and no more. 
Taneiau vs. Meghrigian, Supra. 
Vogel vs. Eckert, 91 Atl. 2d 633 
McHenry vs. Howells, Supra. 
Biggs vs. Bear, Supra. 
The law is also well established that a host-licensor is 
not the insurer of the safety of a guest-licensee and is un-
der no duty to reconstruct his premises for the safety of 
a guest-licensee. 
Scheibel vs. Lipton, Supra. 
McHenry vs. Howells, Supra. 
In two very respectable jurisdictions in this country 
it has been held that there must be evidence of willful and 
wanton injury before a host-licensor can be held liable to 
a guest-licensee for injuries sustained on the premises of 
the host. 
Keretian vs. Asadourian, Supra. 
Gregory vs. Loder, 185 A 360 (N.J.) 
As stated in Ashley vs. Jones, 271 P. 2d 918: 
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HThe duty with respect to a licensee is somewhat 
different (than an invitee) , the owner not being 
liable for injuries resulting from a condition of the 
premises, other than one amounting to a trap, in 
the absence of some active negligence on the part 
of the owner. Oettinger vs. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 
133, 148 P. 2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221." 
(Emphasis Supplied) 
Text authorities have spoken on the subject also and 
it has been announced in 38 Am. fur. 778: 
({There is no duty on the part of the host to recon-
struct or improve the premises for the purpose of 
making his house more convenient or more safe for 
those accepting his hospitality, gratuitously ex-
tended. A better reason for the rule is that a host 
merely offers his premises for enjoyment by his 
guest with the same security that the host and the 
members of his family who reside with him have." 
It is further stated in 65 C.].S. 495: 
HA mere licensee takes the property or premises on 
which he enters as he finds them, enjoys the license 
subject to its concomitant perils, and, although he 
does not necessarily assume all risk of injury by 
going on another's premises, he does assume all of 
the ordinary risks, all danger incident to the con-
dition of the premises or property, particularly 
risks which are obvious and patent. A social guest 
on the host's premises or in his home must take the 
premises as he finds them, with no greater right 
than a mere licensee with respect to the host's lia-
bility for injuries to the guest." 
(Emphasis Supplied) 
The Supreme Court of Utah recently reaffirmed these 
rules in the case of Tempest vs. Richardson, 5 Utah 2d 174, 
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wherein Justice Wade speaking for the Court stated: 
((Respondents did nothing to injure their guest. 
When appellant accepted respondents' hospitality, 
she accepted the conditions ordinarily prevalent in 
their home and cannot be heard to complain about 
the manner in which they constructed their home." 
(Emphasis Supplied) 
and further: 
cc ••• the (lower) court did not err in granting the 
summary judgment in favor of respondents be-
cause appellant's own deposition establishes that 
respondents did no act which could be reasonably 
found to have actively contributed towards her 
injury .... " 
These rules are directly applicable to the case at bar. 
Here, there is no evidence or even an allegation by the 
appellant that the respondents did an affirmative act which 
would conceivably contribute to the fall sustained by the 
appellant. Significantly, neither of the respondents even 
knew the appellant had entered upon their premises prior 
to the time of her mishap. 
Under these uncontroverted facts and the rules an-
nounced by this Court in Tempest vs. Richardson, Supra, 
no issue remained which required the deliberations of a 
jury to resolve. 
B. Appellant Knew Of The Existence Of The Stair-
way In The Garage And Must Therefore Be Charged With 
Assumption Of Risk Or Contributory Negligence As A 
Matter Of Law. 
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It hardly seems necessary to recite here that the 
record in this case clearly establishes that the appellant 
knew of the existence of the stairway and its location in 
the garage she was entering. She had, on her previous visit 
to the home, proceeded out through the den door and then 
turned left toward the entrance to the garage and walked 
down the stairway to and into the basement. On the 
evening of the accident, the appellant, admittedly possessed 
of this knowledge, nevertheless, proceeded directly toward 
the same den door from the garage entrance and would 
have had to pass directly into the open stairwell. In this 
regard the appellant testified (T. 35, Line 27): 
Q: And you knew you were in the garage when 
you made the previous visit? 
A: Yes. 
Q: So you knew the stairway was there and knew 
that it was in the garage? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you knew it on the evening of October 
15, 1956, did you not? 
A: Yes. 
Further, appellant testified (T. 37, Line 1): 
Q: . . . Now then, when you and your husband 
pulled into the driveway on the evening of 
October 15, 1956, you knew that the stairway 
was in the garage because on your previous 
visit you did go down this stairway? 
A: Yes. 
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The appellant cannot escape the consequence of her 
own testimony which clearly establishes that she knew the 
existence of the stairwell and of its relative position in the 
garage. These facts fit the announced rules and supports 
the ruling of the lower court. 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 340, 
states: 
HA possessor of land is not subject to liability to 
his licensees, whether business visitors or gratuitous 
licensees, for bodily harm caused to them by any 
dangerous condition thereon, whether natural or 
artificial, if they know of the condition and realize 
the risk involved therein." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
And further, in sub-section e, entitled ((Assumption 
of Risks by Licensee," it is said: 
HA licensee's privilege to enter land in the posses-
sion of another is derived solely from the possessor's 
consent which he is free to give or withhold, the 
licensee not being entitled to enter without it. The 
licensee, is, therefore, entitled to nothing more than 
knowledge of the actual conditions, which he will 
encounter if he avails himself of the possessor's 
consent. If he knows the conditions, he has an 
opportunity to exercise an intelligent choice as to 
whether the advantage to be gained frmn his entry 
is sufficient to justifJ' hint in incurring the risk 
which he knows is inseparable front it." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Scofield vs. Sprouse-
Reitz Company, 265 P 2d 396: has adopted the general 
rule as stated on Page 861 of 38 Am. fur: 
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cc ••• As it generally is expressed a plaintiff will not 
be held to have been guilty of contributory negli-
gence if it appears that he had no knowledge or 
means of knowledge of the danger, and conversely, 
he will be deemed to have been guilty if it is shown 
that he knew or reasonably should have known of 
the peril and might have avoided it by the exercise 
of ordinary care. . . . " See also Knox vs. Snow, 
(Utah) 229 P. 2d 874. 
On these facts and the announced law there is no 
issue to submit to a jury. Charged with the admitted 
knowledge, the appellant must be charged with the coral-
lary law. It follows that the respondents' motion for a 
directed verdict was properly granted. 
C. Appellant Proceeded Into An Area Without 
Being Able To See Where She Was Going And When Al-
ternate Safe Routes Were Available. She Must, Therefore, 
Be Charged With Contributory Negligence Or Assumption 
Of Risk As A Matter Of Law. 
The appellant testified that as she proceeded into the 
garage area, after the lights on the car driven by her hus-
band had been turned off, it was so dark she could not see 
where she was placing her feet. 
(Her testimony places great weight on the fact that 
the respondents had not turned on a light to illuminate 
her course of travel. This, under the facts and the law, 
we deem of no significance, but we cannot resist the 
temptation to say that if the appellant was so apprehen-
sive of the darkness in the area she was traversing, she 
should have exercised greater caution. Moreover, it would 
have been a simple thing to have left on the lights of the 
car in which she had arrived. Could it reasonably be held 
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that a licensee has a lesser duty to provide available light 
than a licensor?) 
Getting back, though, to the basic proposition. Will 
the appellant be held to be free of negligence by proceed-
ing with abandon into an area which was so dark she 
couldn't even see where she was placing her feet? We be-
lieve that a quotation from the recent Supreme Court 
case of Tempest vs. Richardson, Supra., is directly in point, 
where Justice Wade, speaking for the Court said: 
((Had appellant exercised ordinary and reasonable 
care for her own safety she would not have opened 
a door and stepped into a dark and unlighted area 
with which she was unacquainted, without first 
ascertaining what was beyond the door .... " 
and further: 
u ••• entering a darkened area without first observ-
ing whether it was safe to do so was a failure on 
her part to exercise reasonable care to discover and 
avoid any danger to herself." 
A plaintiff complained of inadequate light in the case 
of Hertz vs. the Advertising Compan)', Supra., and the 
Alabama Court succinctly disposed of this contention by 
saytng: 
uw e are of the opinion that the undisputed evi-
dence showed plaintiff to have been guilty of negli-
gence . . . if they (the premises) were not properly 
lighted, she (the plaintiff) should have been more 
careful in going out of the vestibule into the main 
office building." 
Although a lesser legal duty is involved in the case 
at bar, the foregoing rules have been adopted in the law 
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pertaining to motor vehicles in this state. Several cases 
have been decided by our Supreme Court in which it has 
been held to constitute negligence for a driver to operate 
a car when he cannot see what is ahead of him. 
Nikoleropoulos vs. Ramsey, 61 U tab 465 
Dalley vs. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co. 80 
Utah 331 
Hansen vs. Clyde, 89 Utah 31. 
If the foregoing cases constitute authority in this 
state and if it is negligence for a driver to operate an auto-
mobile so that he cannot stop it within the distance he 
can see ahead of him, how may one step forward into 
blackness and escape the charge that he was negligent in 
so doing? 
As the cases above cited hold, one who is upon prem-
ises with which he is familiar, or even unfamiliar, may 
not assume any condition of safety beyond his range of 
vision, especially if concealed by darkness. One should not 
be heard to complain if he proceeds into an area where he 
cannot see what lies before him, especially if, as here, he is 
familiar with and has previously been apprised of the 
conditions present. 
We believe it is of further weight to draw to the 
attention of the Court that there were alternate routes 
available to the appellant which she was familiar with and 
which she had traveled before. These settled facts should 
be considered in light of the recent Jury Instructions For 
Utah, No. 16.3 entitled rrchoice of Unsafe Alternative 
Path as Contributory Negligence," which reads: 
ulf the plaintiff (party) had two (stairways) 
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(methods of proceeding) by which he might (pro-
ceed) (leave) the defendant's place of business one 
of which was safe, and one of which he kne~ or 
in the exercise of reasonable care would have bad 
reasonable grounds to believe was unsafe, it was 
(his) duty to select the safe (stairway) (method 
of proceeding) and failure to do so would be 
negligence." 
The authority established in this state is extensive and 
persua,.5ive in support of the lower court's ruling on the 
respondents' motion for a directed verdict. 
ANSWER TO ARGUMENT OF APPELLANT 
In the appellant's brief, substantial argument is made 
toward showing this Court when a directed verdict may 
or may not be granted. We are certain the Court is fully 
acquainted with these rules and that the Court still is of 
the opinion that a motion for a directed verdict occupies 
a useful tool in the administration of justice. Needless to 
say, when the record is clear and no significant or substan-
tial dispute exists in the evidence received during the course 
of a proceeding, no fact issue exists upon which a jury 
need deliberate. This is such a proceeding and the cases 
and authorities cited by the appellant on contributory 
negligence constitute no precedent to disturb the present 
ruling. 
Appellant has cited only the case of Wilkerson vs. 
McCarthy, 69 S. Ct. 413 and the case of Deacy vs. Mc-
Dowell, 38 A 2d 181, which need mention. The Wilkerson 
case involved an F.E.L.A. situation with significantly dif-
ferent statutory obligations and duties and constitutes no 
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authority to decide the issues here before the Court. The 
Deacy case, on the other hand, was presented and argued 
to this Court in the recent case of Tempest vs. fuchardson, 
supra., and the questionable rule there announced has now 
been refuted in Utah for the reason that the rule and doc-
trine there adopted was contrary to the holding of the 
Deacy case. 
The appellant further argues that there should have 
been a railing around the stairwell and that she could 
((assume" that one would have been installed subsequent 
to her visit in December after her daughter-in-law had 
informed her they ((planned" to put up a railing. The 
answer to this contention is, that a guest takes the prem-
ises of his host as he finds them and enjoys the premises 
subject to the incident perils. (See Point I A hereof) 
Here the guest-licensee had previously been on the 
premises, was never informed a railing had been erected, 
knew of the existence of the stairwell, failed to leave her 
car lights on, was walking in an area where she could not 
make observations and knew of alternative safe routes to 
walk-all without the respondents' knowing that she was 
present. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant is here complaining of the manner in 
which the home of another was constructed and, by such 
diversionary tactics, gain a further consideration by the 
courts. This case was fully heard below and the record is 
clear as to what the facts are. For very compelling reasons, 
the trial court has directed a verdict predicated upon the 
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testimony of this appellant and the law announced in the 
Tempest case, supra. 
The record conclusively demonstrates that this case 
was properly removed from the jury province for the 
reason that there existed no issue for their deliberation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY and NEBEKER, 
C. PRESTON ALLEN, 
Attorneys for Respondents 
I 
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